The odds that terrorists will soon strike a major city with weapons of mass destruction are now better than even, a bipartisan congressionally mandated task force concludes in a draft study that warns of growing threats from rogue states, nuclear smuggling networks and the spread of atomic know-how in the developing world.

That's a scary, attention-grabbing first sentence. And if terrorists ever do, God forbid, pull off a nuclear detonation a major city, people will no doubt point to this commission as prescient.

But let's think about this for a minute. How could they possibly come up with these "odds" of such an event? I'd like to see the methodology.

The International Atomic Energy Agency's probe into the alleged Syrian nuclear reactor, which Israel bombed last year, has been hobbled by a mysterious lack of satellite footage. IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei referred to the absence of commercial satellite footage of the site after Israel's attack last year as "baffling."

Adding to the intrigue, the Associated Press quotes unnamed diplomats as claiming that IAEA officials are considering the possibility that Syria, or another country with an interest in a coverup, bought the rights to all the commercial satellite photos. Others have proposed more mundane explanations for the lack of satellite imagery, pointing out that the countries involved gave out very few details after the attack, making it difficult for companies to find the site immediately after the bombing.

Coupled with last month's IAEA report, which stated that the building that was bombed shared similarities with a type of nuclear reactor design and that inspectors had found trace amounts of uranium particles there, the site in northern Syria continues to raise more questions than answers. Certainly, there are already enough doubts to delay Syria's request for U.N. aid in planning a commercial nuclear reactor. And if definitive proof emerges that Syria was covertly building a nuclear plant, it could derail the much-anticipated American-Syrian rapprochement.

Photo: SAMUEL KUBANI/AFP/Getty Images

Via Andreas Persbo, some art for arms control geeks. At last:

More:

The artist is Lisa Ruyter. Timothy Hartley Smith has photos of the exhibit.

President-elect Obama's plans to engage the Syrian regime may have just hit an early snag. Diplomats have revealed that samples taken from the site in Syria which Israel bombed in September 2007 contained traces of processed uranium. This evidence, along with uranium traces found by the International Atomic Energy Agency in oil or air samples, lends credence to the hypothesis that a covert nuclear reactor was being constructed in northern Syria, a thesis that some analysts had been skeptical of after the Israeli attack.

Syria's diplomats are going to have a hard time convincing the Obama administration that Syria can be a force for stability in the Middle East if conclusive proof emerges that they were developing a nuclear program on the sly. The regime seems to have already been spooked by the latest revelations. Syrian Ambassador Mohammad Badi Khattab, his country's chief delegate to the IAEA, allegedly suggested that Syria will not allow further IAEA visits "under any circumstances," citing concerns that an IAEA probe could pass on Syria's military secrets to Israel.

The IAEA is annoyed that diplomats leaked its findings before the release of its formal report. Given the timing of the leak, the diplomats may have been specifically aiming to disrupt any rapprochement between Syria and the new Obama administration. But of course, just because they may have ulterior political motives doesn't mean they are wrong about Syria's nuclear ambitions.

Despite all the turmoil in Congress these days, a bill authorizing the U.S.-India nuclear deal has been quietly moving forward, and yesterday it passed the Senate 86-13. This is one of the last steps in the approval process -- it follows what I and many others thought were almost insurmountable obstacles to the deal in the Indian Parliament and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

The summary of the bill, released yesterday, lists several notable provisions that I want to highlight briefly. It notes explicitly that approval of the deal is based on U.S. interpretations of the terms. This means that, contrary to a declaration by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the agreement would not mitigate any penalties incurred by future Indian nuclear tests. For instance, the United States views fuel supply assurances as a political, not a legal, commitment that would almost certainly be suspended in the event of further nuclear tests.

In addition, before any licenses can be approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under this agreement, India's safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency must enter fully into force. At the same time, India's declaration of civilian nuclear facilities must be consistent with the one issued by New Delhi in 2006.

This and several other provisions seem to be designed to allow the United States opportunities to prevent or halt technology transfer if circumstances call for it. Such potential loopholes also highlight one particularly important fact: The deal's approval does not necessarily mean the United States will actually sell much civilian nuclear technology to India. It is now legal to do so in most cases, but political, bureaucratic, economic, or diplomatic barriers may nonetheless end up being too problematic to overcome. Indeed, the Bush administration secretly told Congress it would not sell "sensitive" nuclear technologies to India in a letter earlier this month. For those unhappy with this deal, the details of the bill leave America with plenty of wiggle room.

<!--[if gte mso 9]> Normal 0 false false false <![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]> <![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 10]> <![endif]-->

HR 7801 – approving the U.S.-India peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement

 

<!--[if !supportLists]-->·        <!--[endif]-->H.R. 7801 was approved by the House of Representatives on September 27 by a vote of 298-117, with one member voting present.  The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations approved identical legislation (S. 3548) on September 23 by a vote of 19-2.

 

<!--[if !supportLists]-->·        <!--[endif]-->The bill gives final approval to the agreement with India on peaceful nuclear cooperation.  In the “Hyde Act” (P.L. 109-401), Congress set certain terms and conditions for the agreement, in order to permit the President to submit the agreement under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 

                                                   

<!--[if !supportLists]-->·        <!--[endif]-->The Senate approved the Hyde Act by a vote of 85-12 on November 16, 2006 (the conference report was approved by voice vote on December 9, 2006).  Under the Hyde Act and the Atomic Energy Act, the agreement cannot enter into force unless Congress approves the agreement.

 

<!--[if !supportLists]-->·        <!--[endif]-->The Hyde Act required the President to make several determinations to Congress in submitting the agreement.  These included –

 

<!--[if !supportLists]-->o       <!--[endif]-->that India has provided the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) a credible plan to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities;

<!--[if !supportLists]-->o       <!--[endif]-->that India and the IAEA have concluded all legal steps required prior to signature of an IAEA safeguards agreement;

<!--[if !supportLists]-->o       <!--[endif]-->that India and the IAEA are making substantial progress toward concluding an Additional Protocol to the safeguards agreement, based on the Model Additional Protocol; and

<!--[if !supportLists]-->o       <!--[endif]-->that the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), an informal organization consisting of 44 countries, has decided by consensus to permit supply to India of nuclear items covered by the NSG guidelines.

 

<!--[if !supportLists]-->·        <!--[endif]-->The President made the required determinations on September 10, 2008, a few days after the NSG, meeting in Vienna, gave approval to nuclear commerce with India.

 

<!--[if !supportLists]-->·        <!--[endif]-->H.R. 7081 was developed on a bipartisan basis by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and in consultation with the Department of State.  The Bush Administration supports H.R. 7081.

 

<!--[if !supportLists]-->·        <!--[endif]-->The bill waives the 30-day consultation requirement in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, because this 30 day clock is not expected to elapse until mid-October.

 

<!--[if !supportLists]-->·        <!--[endif]-->The bill also improves congressional oversight, and sets forth markers regarding implementation of the agreement and U.S. non-proliferation policy, specifically:

 

<!--[if !supportLists]-->1.      <!--[endif]-->It makes clear that all aspects of the Atomic Energy Act and the Hyde Act other than those relating to how the agreement is approved will continue to apply to the U.S.-India agreement.

 

<!--[if !supportLists]-->2.      <!--[endif]-->It reaffirms that approval of the agreement is based on U.S. interpretations of its terms.  This relates to several issues, including the U.S. view that fuel assurances provided by President Bush are a political, rather than legally binding, commitment.

 

<!--[if !supportLists]-->3.      <!--[endif]-->It requires the President to certify that approving the agreement is consistent with the U.S. obligation under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty not to assist or encourage India to produce nuclear weapons. 

<!--[if !supportLists]-->4.      <!--[endif]-->Before any licenses can be issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under the agreement, the bill requires that India’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA enter into force, and that India file a declaration of civilian nuclear facilities under the safeguards agreement that is not “materially inconsistent” with the separation plan that India issued in 2006. 

<!--[if !supportLists]-->5.      <!--[endif]-->The bill requires prompt notification to Congress if India diverges from its separation plan in implementing its safeguards agreement.

 

<!--[if !supportLists]-->6.      <!--[endif]-->The bill establishes a procedure for congressional review of any subsequent arrangement under the agreement that would allow India to reprocess spent nuclear fuel that was derived from U.S.-supplied reactor fuel or produced with U.S.-supplied equipment.  Under current law (Section 131 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954), such arrangements take effect 15 days after notice thereof is published in the Federal Register. 

 

<!--[if !supportLists]-->7.      <!--[endif]-->The bill enhances general oversight of nuclear cooperation agreements by requiring that the President keep the Foreign Relations Committee “fully and currently informed” of any initiative or negotiations on new or amended civilian nuclear cooperation agreements.

 

<!--[if !supportLists]-->8.      <!--[endif]-->The bill requires the President to certify that it is U.S. policy to work in the Nuclear Suppliers Group to achieve further restrictions on transfers of enrichment and reprocessing equipment or technology.

 

<!--[if !supportLists]-->9.      <!--[endif]-->The bill also directs the President to seek international agreement on procedures to guard against the diversion of heavy water from civilian to military programs, and requires the President to keep Congress regularly apprised of how that effort is proceeding. 

 

I mentioned a few weeks ago that I was getting awfully tired of reading about Russia's strongly worded but vague "warnings" to its neighbors. Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski agrees, and expressed his displeasure yesterday in the politest way imaginable:

"Of course we don't like it when the Russian president or Russian generals threaten us with nuclear annihilation. It is not a friendly thing to do, and we have asked them to do it no more than once a month."

Who could say no to that?

Pakistan: just the kind of stable, responsible country we'd like to see expanding its ability to produce nuclear weapons. The Institute for Science and International Security reports:

 ISIS has obtained commercial satellite imagery from DigitalGlobe taken on September 3, 2008, May 18, 2008 and February 9, 2008 of the Khushab plutonium production reactor site in Pakistan. The imagery shows further construction of the second and third plutonium production reactors at Khushab (Figure 1), and that construction of the second reactor may be nearing completion. The images show a clearly visible row of cooling towers, typically built in the later phase of reactor construction (Figure 3). Given this state of construction, the second reactor could start in a year.

Once completed, these reactors will increase several-fold Pakistan’s ability to make weapon-grade plutonium for nuclear weapons. The wider implication of Pakistan increasing its plutonium production capacity must not be overlooked—there is a real risk that it will exacerbate an India-Pakistan nuclear arms race and increase tensions more broadly between the two.

Some straight talk from Moammar el-Qaddafi:

What Iran is doing stems simply from arrogance," Gaddafi said during a visit to Tunisia after Tehran ignored another western deadline to accept an incentives package in exchange for full transparency on its nuclear drive. [...]

"In the event of a decision against Iran, this country will suffer the same outcome as Iraq... Iran is not any stronger than Iraq and won't have the means to resist (a military attack) on its own... The challenges are greater and exceed Iran's ability to reply."

Minot Air Force Base is not having a good news year. Last year, cruise missiles armed with nuclear weapons left the base by accident; this March, the Air Force discovered it had inadvertently shipped fuse components for nuclear weapons to Taiwan in 2006; and in May, Minot's 5th Bomb Wing failed a security test. Now we have news of another mishap, this time involving classified material at Minot.

In a story that more properly belongs in the beginning of a bad made-for-TV drama, a missile crew in possession of a nuclear launch code "component," while waiting for transport in a crew rest area, fell asleep.

An initial report simply said that "a nuclear launch code was lost or misplaced," but the Air Force later clarified that the codes in possession of the sleeping crewmembers had been superseded by a new set and were no longer usable. In addition, according to the press release, the codes were locked up with a combination known only to the crew and the entire facility was secured throughout the incident by Air Force Security Forces.

Now, it is true that the codes were probably never in danger of being compromised. It would also be understandable in almost any other circumstance that the crew would fall asleep while waiting for transport; generally, missile crews consist of three people who rotate watches over a three-day period. These rotations are likely tiring, and indeed the crews have been complaining about the length of the new rotations (for more about life as a "missileer," check out this fascinating article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists). And the punishment for the people at fault looks to be swift.

More worrisome, though, is the pattern incidents like these are beginning to reveal. The "loose nukes" incident last year resulted from a whole cascade of minor security slip-ups just like this one, and where one such incident is reported many more are likely present. The prestige of working with U.S. nuclear forces continues to drop -- how do we make sure the ultimate weapons stay secure if things continue to get worse?

The Rolls-Royce brand is most firmly associated with ultra-luxury cars, but its engineering wing, Rolls-Royce plc, is also actually the second-largest maker of airplane engines in the world. Now, the company is diversifying even further, with plans to set up a full-fledged nuclear division to "manufacture equipment and provide advice to governments on their atomic energy programs."

Rolls-Royce has been supplying safety instrumentation and control technology to France's nuclear reactors for some time now, and it also has nuclear clients in the United States, China, and the Czech Republic -- creating a separate nuclear division is likely part marketing and part expansion. Since the company projects an almost 70 percent increase in the value of the civil nuclear industry by 2023, it's no surprise that it would try to leverage its unique skills and experience to cash in on the purported "nuclear renaissance."

It is surprising that the article explicitly mentions decommissioning (of aging nuclear plants) and cleanup (of plants and other nuclear sites) as potential moneymakers. Companies that deal in nuclear reactors and related products usually focus on the potential for profit in new nuclear plants and a large expansion in the use of nuclear power. Decommissioning and cleanup will become increasingly prominent issues as the world's current nuclear fleet ages, and often responsibility for such problems is laid at the government's doorstep.

Hopefully, more private entities will see fit to focus on concerns like these in the future -- and if we must have new nuclear power plants, we might as well make them Rolls-Royces.

I noted yesterday that Haaretz columnist Shmuel Rosner believes that Israel will attack Iran to force the international community to act. Now, maverick Israeli historian Benny Morris weighs in on the New York Times op-ed page, declaring flatly that "Israel will almost surely attack Iran's nuclear sites in the next four to seven months... an Israeli nuclear strike to prevent the Iranians from taking the final steps toward getting the bomb is probable." Say what? Earlier, this week, I questioned a story in The Times of London saying that Washington had given Tel Aviv an "amber light" to proceed with attack plans.

What's going on? I have a guess: Israel is playing bad cop to America's good cop. The Times story provides one clue: "[T]he Israelis have also been told that they can expect no help from American forces and will not be able to use U.S. military bases in Iraq for logistical support." It's hard to imagine the Israelis could or would pull off a strike without U.S. help, so this is probably disinformation intended to send the message that Israel could act alone (which is doubtful for geographic, technical, and diplomatic reasons).

So, when Undersecretary of State William Burns meets with Iranian officials this weekend, he can thus implicitly present himself as their protector from the big, bad Israelis. Look here, Mr. Jalili: The United States is the reasonable one, willing to negotiate and compromise -- and only George W. Bush can talk the Israelis out of launching Osirak II. All you need to do is freeze your uranium enrichment and we can start talking for real. I'm sure Iranian leaders are aware of what is going on, but there may be just enough doubt in their minds to make this an effective gambit.

Haaretz correspondent Shmuel Rosner, writing in the The New Republic, argues that Israel might attack Iran not to destroy its nuclear program -- which it probably can't do -- but to force the international community to act:

The main goal of a hit would not be to destroy the program completely, but rather to awaken the international community from its slumber and force it to finally engineer a solution to the crisis. As one former Israeli official put it, any attack on Iran's reactors--as long as it is not perceived as a military failure--can serve as a means of "stirring the pot" of international geopolitics. Israel, in other words, wouldn't be resorting to military action because it is convinced that diplomacy by the international community cannot stop Iran; it would be resorting to military action because only diplomacy by the international community can stop Iran.

I don't believe this is Israel's first option. More likely, Israel's threats are intended to ratchet up the pressure on Iran to compromise. But as Rosner notes, "The more Israel pledges to stop Iran, the more it becomes necessary to deliver." If you keep crying "wolf!" and nobody listens, the best way to get people's attention is to shoot the wolf.

This is an interesting new development:

In a break with past Bush administration policy, a top U.S. diplomat will for the first time join colleagues from other world powers at a weekend meeting with Iran's chief nuclear negotiator... William Burns, America's third highest-ranking diplomat, will attend talks with the Iranian envoy, Saeed Jalili, in Switzerland on Saturday aimed at persuading Iran to halt activities that could lead to the development of atomic weapons, a senior U.S. official told the AP on Tuesday.

I wouldn't get my hopes up just yet for this move. As the official told the AP, "This is a one-time event and [Burns] will be there to listen, not negotiate... [O]ur terms for negotiations remain the same: Iran must suspend its enrichment and reprocessing activities."

The diplomats will be looking to hear Iran's answer to the latest package of incentives offered by the P5+1 (the permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany). Judging by the Islamic Republic's initial response (pdf), we're likely to hear a lot of bluster and claims that Iran is being treated unfairly. But who knows? Maybe Burns's presence could change the dynamic.

Yesterday, Pyongyang submitted a long-overdue declaration of its nuclear programs to China, in accordance with agreements made during the six-party talks. U.S. President George W. Bush welcomed the move as "one step in the multi-step process laid out by the six-party talks," immediately lifted the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act, and notified Congress of his intent to remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.

What does all this mean in practice? The Bush administration's moves are highly symbolic, and unlikely to have any immediate, practical impact. Most U.S. sanctions based on the Trading with the Enemy Act (pdf) were already lifted in 2000, and most of those still in place are authorized by an overlapping hodgepodge of other laws and regulations. Minor changes will go into effect -- for instance, some imports from North Korea will no longer require licenses -- but for the most part trade policies will remain unchanged.

Bush's intention to remove North Korea from the state sponsors of terror list is a similarly symbolic gambit; the actual removal cannot go into effect for 45 days after the notification to Congress, and in any case it is probably contingent on verifying North Korea's nuclear declaration. Countries on the terror list cannot receive, among other things, U.S. economic aid or loans from the World Bank and other financial institutions. Removing North Korea from the list may allow more money to flow in, but, as a U.S. Treasury spokesman noted yesterday, sanctions aimed at preventing money laundering, illicit finance, and weapons proliferation will remain firmly in place.

Practicalities aside, this development has rightly been hailed as a diplomatic success; the New York Times today declared it a "triumph." The path to a denuclearized North Korea is still long and the process could easily be derailed at any point, but it is nice to finally have some reason, however slight, for optimism.

Via Mike Nizza, North Korea blows up the cooling tower at its now-defunct Yongbyon reactor:

Today, apparently, is International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, and the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is launching a new three-year campaign called "Do drugs control your life?"

But instead of releasing statements from Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon or posting video clips in Serbian on YouTube, maybe the office should spend more time lobbying the Security Council and the IAEA.

The ongoing standoff with Tehran over its nuclear aims is threatening a rare cooperative venture between Iran and the West: Tehran's campaign to stem opium and other drug trafficking from Afghanistan through Iran to Europe. In a little-noticed provision in the incentives package offered to Tehran on June 14, Western countries threatened to cut off further aid to the anti-drug efforts unless Iran agrees to halt its uranium enrichment.

Such measures would harm anti-drug efforts in the Middle East and Europe, U.N. officials say. Iran caught approximately 900 tons of Afghan drugs in 2007, and UNDOC Director Antonio Maria Costa warned that a "heroin tsunami" could hit Europe if aid were cut. And it could be devastating for Iran as well. Despite devoting 30,000 troops (like the fellow in the photo above) to drug patrols in border areas, the Islamic Republic already contains the highest proportion of heroin and opium addicts in the world, experts believe.

You're going to hear a lot in the coming days, I expect, about how the "North Korea model" can be applied to negotiations with Iran. Forgive me for raining on the parade here, but there are some important differences that we need to keep in mind.

1. Iran is not on the brink of mass famine.
2. Iran has enormous oil and gas resources; North Korea is in desperate need of imported fuel oil and has few legitimate sources of foreign exchange.
3. Iran can stir up trouble in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, the Gulf, and the Palestinian territories.
4. Iran has the ability to launch sophisticated terrorist attacks all over the world; North Korea did not.
5. Iran's nuclear program has broad support in a regime where decision-making is diffuse and opaque; Kim Jong Il had much more lattitude to make the big decision to come in from the cold.

It's also worth noting that North Korea is keeping the nuclear weapons it has already produced, whereas Iran is still in the enrichment and research phase. It's by no means clear the regime has decided to go for the bomb, as opposed to latent nuclear capacity.

I'm not saying the United States shouldn't engage Iran, but just trying to point out that the Islamic Republic is a much tougher nut to crack.

Last Saturday, International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei sat for an Arabic-language interview on the al-Arabiya network. During a discussion about Iran, ElBaradei was asked how much time the country would need to "produce" a nuclear weapon. "It would need at least six months to one year," he replied.

Even though this estimate has been tossed around for years (particularly by Israel), given some caveats it is still within a generally accepted range of possible timelines for an Iranian bomb. ElBaradei's statement is surprising, though, because previously he has "consistently said that it would take Iran from three to eight years to make a weapon."

This sharp rhetorical shift could be the result of new findings about Iran that have not yet been released. Perhaps ElBaradei knows something we don't and he just slipped. It is possible, for example, that large numbers of Iran's third-generation centrifuges (the IR-3) are installed in secret locations. The IR-3 can probably enrich uranium significantly faster than Iran's current models and could reduce the time needed to produce enough material for a bomb. Tehran has only installed a handful of these centrifuges as far as we know, though, and is apparently still having trouble with them.

It seems far more likely that this was a signal to Iran that patience is running out. ElBaradei trained as a diplomat, and gaffe-prone individuals almost never rise to his level. He was also careful to emphasize that the threat is not imminent, noting specifically that making a weapon so quickly would require Iran to expel inspectors and withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty. In a further sign that the IAEA is willing to increase pressure, its most recent report (pdf) on Tehran's nuclear program expressed -- in unusually blunt fashion -- growing frustration within the agency at Iran’s "persistent stonewalling" and accused Tehran of withholding important information on alleged nuclear weapons programs.

So far, Iran has judged that fostering uncertainty about its nuclear weapons program would divide the international community and defuse pressure for stronger punitive actions. Hopefully, the IAEA's shift signals that Tehran has failed to divide and conquer.

Drudge is linking to this story with the dramatic headline, "SUMMER SHOWDOWN: Israeli minister says alternatives to attack on Iran running out..."

The article quotes Israeli Transportation Minister Shaul Mofaz as issuing an unusually blunt warning to Iran: "If Iran continues its nuclear weapons programme, we will attack it."

The thing to remember about Israeli politics is that it's a parliamentary system. So, the ministers don't serve "at the pleasure of the president"; they're independent politicians with their own bases of support, even if they hail from the same political party as the prime minister.

So, this is not the same thing as U.S. Transportation Secretary Mary E. Peters (who, incidentally, has a blog called "Fast Lane") issuing a press release. We can safely presume that Peters speaks for the Bush administration.

But the hawkish Mofaz, a former defense minister and military chief of staff, doesn't necessarily speak for the Israeli government. He's probably ramping things up now that he sees a chance to take Ehud Olmert's job, and angling to outmaneuver Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, his chief rival within the Kadima Party. Mofaz is playing politics here, not explaining policy. Still, I would advise the folks in Tehran not to take Mofaz's threat lightly.

UPDATE: Olmert's spokesman distances the prime minister from Mofaz's comments.